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Although non-consciously perceived information has previously been assumed to be
short-lived (<500ms), recent findings show that non-consciously perceived information
can be maintained for at least 15 s. Such findings can be explained as working
memory without a conscious experience of the information to be retained. However,
whether or not working memory can operate on non-consciously perceived information
remains controversial, and little is known about the nature of such non-conscious
visual short-term memory (VSTM). Here we used continuous flash suppression to
render stimuli non-conscious, to investigate the properties of non-consciously perceived
representations in delayed match-to-sample (DMS) tasks. In Experiment I we used
variable delays (5 or 15 s) and found that performance was significantly better than
chance and was unaffected by delay duration, thereby replicating previous findings.
In Experiment II the DMS task required participants to combine information of spatial
position and object identity on a trial-by-trial basis to successfully solve the task. We
found that the conjunction of spatial position and object identity was retained, thereby
verifying that non-conscious, trial-specific information can be maintained for prospective
use. We conclude that our results are consistent with a working memory interpretation,
but that more research is needed to verify this interpretation.
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Introduction
Non-consciously perceived information can be processed at all levels of the visual system (Rees
et al., 2002; Kouider and Dehaene, 2007), and influence executive functions (Lau and Passingham,
2007; van Gaal et al., 2010). It is less clear for how long non-consciously perceived information
can be retained and influence behavior. It was previously assumed that non-consciously perceived
information is extremely fleeting, and would cease to be detectable within 500ms after stimulus
offset (Greenwald et al., 1996; Mattler, 2005; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). However, recent
studies have found that non-consciously perceived information is more durable than previously
assumed. For example, Reber et al. (2012) found that repeatedly presented masked word-pairs
could influence decision-making 1min later, and that hippocampal BOLD signal change at
encoding predicted the outcomes. Bar and Biederman (1998, 1999) found behavioral evidence of
non-consciously encoded visual repetition priming effects on naming tasks after 15–20min, and
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Gaillard et al. (2007) found electrophysiological repetition
effects (but no behavioral effects) 47min after single
presentations of masked words. These studies suggest that
non-consciously perceived information can form long-lasting
latent neural representations reminiscent of consciously encoded
hippocampus-based memory (Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000) and
visual repetition priming (Henson, 2003) mechanisms.
However, whether or not non-consciously perceived
information can be actively maintained for prospective use
after stimulus offset (i.e., working memory) is still unclear.
Initial findings suggest that working memory can operate
on non-consciously perceived information. Soto et al. (2011)
used delayed cue-target orientation discrimination tasks to
demonstrate that 1–2 non-consciously presented items can be
maintained during a distractor-filled delay of up to 5 s. Dutta
et al. (2014) later used fMRI to link performance on the delayed
cue-target discrimination task to BOLD signal change in the
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and transcranial direct
current stimulation to causally link DLPFC to performance.
Pan et al. (2014) found that when a non-consciously presented
face matched an interocularly suppressed face, the latter had
prior entry into conscious awareness compared to non-matching
items, but only when the face was needed for prospective use.
We have previously used an attentional-blink paradigm to
demonstrate that non-consciously presented information can
be maintained during a distracter-filled delay for up to 15 s,
which was associated with BOLD signal change in the prefrontal
cortex (Bergström and Eriksson, 2014). Accordingly, it has been
suggested that working memory can operate on non-consciously
perceived information (Soto and Silvanto, 2014).
Little is known about the properties of this non-conscious
visual short-term memory (VSTM) and we here aim to further
clarify the nature of non-conscious memory representations. To
this end we used continuous flash suppression (CFS; Tsuchiya
and Koch, 2005) to render stimuli non-conscious during a
delayed match-to-sample (DMS) task. CFS has become popular
in studies of non-conscious processes, because CFS can in an
efficient and easily controlled manner suppress the conscious
experience of stimuli for long periods of time (e.g., up to 3min;
Tsuchiya and Koch, 2005). Such long presentation durations
can potentially enable more reliable and durable non-conscious
representations, compared to for example masked stimuli.
Here we wanted to replicate our previous findings that non-
consciously perceived information can be retained for at least
15 s (Bergström and Eriksson, 2014) with CFS, and determine
which properties of the non-conscious representations that can
be retained and influence DMS performance.
Experiment I
In Experiment I we used CFS to suppress faces that expressed
angry or neutral emotions presented within a spatial quadrant
of the visual field, with variable delay durations (5 or 15 s), to
investigate if non-consciously perceived visual information can
be retained for similar delay durations as with attentional blink
(Bergström and Eriksson, 2014) and masking (Soto et al., 2011)
manipulations.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Nineteen healthy participants were recruited from the Umeå
University campus area. All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, right-eye dominance, gave written
informed consent, and were paid for participation. Two
participants were excluded for systematically giving the same
response instead of guessing when stimulus was not experienced,
one for having an extremely high DMS accuracy of stimuli that
were reportedly not experienced (d′ = 2.16, > 3 SD above the
group mean), and one where CFS did not consistently suppress
the appearance of the target stimuli. Thus, 15 participants (M =
23 years, 11 females) were included in the statistical analyses.
Stimuli and Procedure
The experiment consisted of 270 DMS trials dispersed on
three presentation conditions (50 conscious, 170 non-conscious,
and 50 “baseline” trials, see below for description), randomly
distributed between two delay durations (5 or 15 s) between the
stimulus presentation and the DMS response (Figure 1). The
stimuli consisted of gray-scaled and Gaussian blurred (1 pixel
radius) images of faces (height: 1.6–1.8◦, width: 1.3–1.5◦, average
luminance: 4.3 cd/m2) expressing angry or neutral emotions
(four faces of each emotion) at 75% opaqueness level (to lower
contrast relative to a gray background), and positioned in one of
four spatial quadrants. The stimuli were presented on a computer
monitor in front of a mirror stereoscope that isolated the visual
input from the left side of the monitor to the participants left
eye, and vice versa for the right side. The monitor was placed
at a length that enabled all visual input to be presented within
6◦ horizontally and 9.6◦ vertically. The stimulus to be held in
VSTM was presented for 3 s, either to both eyes simultaneously
(consciously experienced), or only to the non-dominant (left)
eye while colored squares of random composition (mondrians;
height: 4.2◦, width: 4.2◦ luminance: ∼30 cd/m2) where flashed
with a frequency of 10Hz to the dominant eye to suppress
the stimulus from conscious experience (Tsuchiya and Koch,
2005). During the baseline trials mondrians were presented to
the dominant eye while an empty gray background (height: 4.2◦,
width: 4.2◦, luminance: 8.6 cd/m2) was presented to the non-
dominant eye. Critically, the visual experience of baseline and
non-conscious trials is the same (experiencing only mondrians).
After the delay period a DMS response was prompted by
a probe with an identical face, emotion, and spatial position
as previously presented (match), or with a different face,
emotion, and spatial position (non-match). The participants were
instructed to decide if the previously presented stimulus was a
spatial match or non-match to the probe (thus, the participants
were not instructed to remember face identity or emotional
expression). If they had not experienced the target stimulus
(i.e., only experienced mondrians) they were instructed to guess
on the first alternative that came to mind (match/no match).
After the DMS response, they were prompted to estimate the
conscious experience of the stimulus on a three-point perceptual
awareness scale (PAS; Sandberg et al., 2010). The participants
were instructed and trained to use the PAS scale as follows: 1= no
perceptual experience, 2= vague perceptual experience, and 3 =
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FIGURE 1 | Trial procedure. Depending on the presentation condition, two identical stimuli (faces), stimulus and mondrians, or empty background and mondrians
were presented to the left and right eye respectively. The spatial position of the stimulus was then to be retained for a 5 or 15 s delay period, until a probe prompted
the participants to respond whether or not the probe’s position matched the previously presented position. Next, the participants gave an estimate of their perceptual
experience of the stimulus. Finally, they responded whether or not a stimulus had been present. DMS, delayed match-to-sample task; PAS, perceptual awareness
scale; (i), probe matches presentation; (ii), probe does not match presentation.
clear or almost clear perceptual experience of the target stimulus.
Lastly, the participants were prompted to make a detection
response to determine if a target stimulus had been presented at
all (yes or no). If they had not perceptually experienced a stimulus
they were to guess per the same instructions as for the DMS
task. After participants had received instructions, they performed
a practice run of the experiment with the instructor until their
behavior was consistent with the instructions, after which the
actual experiment started. After the experiment the participants
were debriefed and asked about their behavior in relation to the
instructions.
Statistical Analyses
Trials with a DMS response time (RT) of<250ms or>M+ 3 SD
were excluded as outliers prior to any statistical analyses (Ratcliff,
1993). Only trials in the baseline and non-conscious presentation
conditions with PAS = 1, and trials in the conscious condition
with PAS = 3 were used in the statistical analyses, and will for
simplicity hereby be referred to as baseline, non-conscious, and
conscious trials. Signal detection theory (d′) was used to calculate
performance on the discrimination (DMS) and detection tasks
(Macmillan and Creelman, 1991). For DMS d′ the signal was
defined as the spatial quadrant where a face appeared. Hits were
therefore defined as a match between presentation target and
probe together with a “match” response, and false alarms (FAs)
as a non-match between presentation target and probe together
with a “match” response. For the detection task, hits were defined
as the presence of a target stimulus together with a “yes” response,
and FA were defined as the absence of a target stimulus (i.e.,
baseline trials) together with a “yes” response.
Results
The presence of CFS efficiently suppressed the visual input to
the non-dominant eye from conscious experience in the non-
conscious condition (Table 1). In the following results, all trials
TABLE 1 | CFS efficiency.
Conditions PAS
1 2 3
Baseline 48 2 0
Non-consc. 128 33 9
Conscious 1 1 48
Average trial frequency of each presentation condition distributed on reported perceptual
awareness scale (PAS) responses per participant.
with PAS > 1 were removed to ensure no visibility at all of the
target stimulus in non-conscious and baseline conditions. A 2×2
(visual experience × delay time; Figure 2) repeated measures
ANOVA was used to test if DMS performance (d′) changed as
a function of (delay) time and/or visibility. There was a main
effect of visibility [F(1, 14) = 8.3, p < 0.001], but not time
[F(1, 14) = 0.02, p = 0.89] and no interaction effect between
visibility and time [F(1, 14) = 0.94, p = 0.35]. Since there was
neither a main effect of time nor an interaction effect between
time and visibility we proceeded to treat the two time points
together. T-tests were used to determine if memory performance
(Figure 2A) was above chance (i.e., d′ > 0), and revealed that
non-conscious [t(14) = 2.24, p = 0.02, one-tailed, M = 0.22,
SE = 0.10, P(hits) = 0.47, P(FA) = 0.39] and conscious [t(14) =
127, p < 0.001, one-tailed, M = 3.35, SE = 0.03, P(hits) = 0.95,
P(FA) = 0.09] DMS d′ was greater than zero. Thus, the DMS
results replicated previous research (Bergström and Eriksson,
2014).
For the detection response, a 2×2 repeated measures ANOVA
showed a main effect of visibility [F(1, 14) = 13.4, p < 0.001],
but not time [F(1, 14) = 1.75, p = 0.21] and no interaction
effect between visibility and time [F(1, 14) = 1.27, p = 0.28].
Treating both time points together, t-tests showed that detection
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FIGURE 2 | Task performance. Mean d′ performance for non-conscious and conscious (A) delayed match-to-sample (DMS; discrimination), and (B) detection
tasks for each delay duration with standard error. Mean DMS response time (RT) for (C) hits and (D) correct rejections for each delay duration with standard error.
Dotted lines represent baseline RT.
d′ (Figure 2B) was greater than zero for conscious trials [t(14) =
33, p < 0.001, one-tailed, M = 3.58, SE = 0.11, P(hits) = 0.97,
P(FA)= 0.11], but not for non-conscious trials [t(14) = 0.83, p =
0.21, one-tailed, M = 0.10, SE = 0.12, P(hits) = 0.51, P(FA) =
0.48]. Thus, participants could not tell whether a target stimulus
had been presented or not for the non-conscious trials. The
non-conscious DMS d′ and detection d′ were not significantly
different from each other [t(14) = 1.07, p = 0.30].
Repeated measures ANOVAs were used to determine if
response time of the DMS task (RT) differed as a function of time
and/or visibility for hits and correct rejections (CRs) separately.
We hypothesized that RT for both hits and CRs would be faster
than baseline if the representation was held in working memory,
while only hits would be faster if the representation depended on
repetition priming (since there is no stimulus repetitions in CRs).
The ANOVA on hits revealed a main effect of visibility [F(1, 14) =
21, p < 0.001], but not time [F(1, 14) = 0.96, p = 0.34] and
no interaction effect between visibility and time [F(1, 14) = 1.02,
p = 0.33]. Paired t-tests on RTs combined over time showed that
hits (Figure 2C) were faster than baseline (M = 2295, SE = 116)
for conscious trials [t(14) = −4.32, p = 0.001, M = 1782, SE =
89] but not for non-conscious trials [t(14) = 1.31, p = 0.21,M =
2428, SE = 147]. The ANOVA on CRs revealed that the main
effect of visibility was at trend [F(1, 14) = 3.38, p = 0.09], but no
effect of time [F(1, 14) = 1.07, p = 0.32] or an interaction effect
[F(1, 14) = 0.03, p = 0.86]. RT on CRs (Figure 2D) was faster
than baseline for both conscious [paired t-tests; t(14) = −3.72,
p = 0.002, M = 1797, SE = 117] and non-conscious trials
[t(14) = −3.69, p = 0.002,M = 2080, SE= 131].
If participants generated a guess of the target directly after the
presentation and consciously held that guess in WM during the
delay, then the RTs for non-conscious and baseline trials should
be equal to the RT for conscious trials. To investigate this issue,
we calculated paired t-tests for RTs averaged across delay-time,
hits, misses, FAs, and CRs. RT for conscious trials (M = 1788,
SE = 93) were faster than RTs for non-conscious [t(14) = −3.46,
p = 0.004, M = 2241, SE = 131] and baseline [t(14) = −4.38,
p = 0.001] trials, while there was no difference between non-
conscious and baseline trials [t(14) = −0.97, p = 0.35]. These
results show that there is a difference between conscious and
non-conscious and also baseline trials, presumably because of the
extra deliberation time before the guessing response, and indicate
that participants had not already guessed the target before the
probe appeared. Guessing performance above chance level is thus
consistent with non-consciously retained information.
Experiment II
Experiment I showed that non-consciously perceived
information was retained for up to 15 s in a DMS paradigm
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using CFS to present stimuli non-consciously. However, since
the samples were either fully matched or not matched at
all in relation to the three information components (spatial
position, face identity, and emotion), it is not possible to know
which component(s) that were retained in memory. Indeed,
spatial attentional effects rather than item-specific memory
representations may have driven performance on non-conscious
trials. In Experiment II we therefore investigated the content
of the information retained by presenting tools at specific
spatial positions, and by using probe stimuli that matched
in terms of both object and position information (similar to
Experiment I), only object, only position, or neither of the
information components. It is possible that non-conscious
memory mechanisms only retain one of the information
components (e.g., the spatial position) despite a conscious task
set to retain both. However, if item-specific representations,
defined as an arbitrary combination of spatial position and object
identity that change from trial to trial, are retained across the
delay, the conjunction of spatial- and object information would
be preferentially retained over one of the components.
Furthermore, given the uniform effect across delay duration
(5 vs. 15 s) in Experiment I, all trials in Experiment II had
a 5 s delay period. We chose to use tools as stimuli instead
of faces for two reasons: (i) we reasoned that within-category
discrimination might be easier for tools because of their
distinctly different shapes/features, and (ii) previous research
have indicated that tools may be more reliably processed during
interocular suppression with CFS (Fang and He, 2005; Almeida
et al., 2008).
Materials and Methods
Participants
Nineteen healthy participants were recruited from the Umeå
University campus area. All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision, right-eye dominance, gave written
informed consent, and were paid for participation. Two
participants were excluded for systematically giving the same
response instead of guessing when the stimulus was not
experienced, and one where CFS did not consistently suppress the
appearance of the target stimuli. Thus, 16 participants (M = 25
years, 9 females) were included in the statistical analyses.
Stimuli and Procedure
The experiment consisted of 396 trials dispersed on three
presentation conditions (117 conscious, 222 non-conscious, and
57 baseline trials). The procedure for Experiment II (Figure 3)
was identical to that of Experiment I in all aspects except for
the following alterations. Firstly, the delay duration between
stimuli presentation and response was set to 5 s. Secondly, the
detection response was excluded. Thirdly, the stimuli material
used was changed from faces to six different gray silhouettes of
tools (height: 1.7◦, width: 1.7◦, Gaussian blur: 1 pixel radius,
luminance: 8.4 cd/m2). The participants were instructed to
remember both the tool and its spatial position. For it to be a
“match,” the probe stimulus had to be the same tool and be in
the same spatial position (full match). If the probe contained the
same tool at a different spatial position (object match), different
tool at the same spatial position (spatial match), or different tool
FIGURE 3 | Trial procedure. Depending on the presentation condition, two identical stimuli (tools), stimulus and mondrians, or empty background and mondrians
were presented to the left and right eye respectively. The stimulus’ position and identity was then to be retained for a 5 s delay period, until a probe prompted the
participants to respond whether or not the probe’s position and identity matched the previously presented position and identity. Finally, they gave an estimate of their
perceptual experience of the stimulus. DMS, delayed match-to-sample task; PAS, perceptual awareness scale; (i), Probe identity and position matches presentation;
(ii), Probe identity matches presentation; (iii), Probe position matches presentation; (iv), Probe does not match presentation.
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at a different spatial position (non-match), it should be answered
with a “no match” response.
Statistical Analyses
Outliers and inclusion criteria for statistical analyses were
identical to Experiment I. For DMS d′ the signal was defined as
the object identity and its spatial position. Hits were therefore
defined as a (position and identity) match between sample and
probe together with a “match” response, and FAs as a non-
match (which includes cases where only position, only identity,
or neither was a match) between sample and probe together with
a “match” response.
Results
The presence of CFS efficiently suppressed the visual input to
the non-dominant eye from conscious experience in the non-
conscious condition (Table 2). In the following results, all trials
with PAS > 1 were removed to ensure no visibility at all of
the target stimulus in non-conscious and baseline conditions. T-
tests were used to determine if memory performance was above
chance. DMS d′ (Figure 4A) was greater than zero for non-
conscious trials [t(15) = 3.17, p = 0.003, one-tailed, M = 0.22,
SE = 0.07, P(hits) = 0.56, P(FA) = 0.48] and conscious trials
[t(15) = 38, p < 0.001, one-tailed,M = 4.12, SE= 0.11, P(hits)=
0.97, P(FA)= 0.03].
To examine the relative contributions of spatial position,
object identity, and the conjunction of both in driving the
non-conscious DMS d′ effect, we looked at the proportion of
TABLE 2 | CFS efficiency.
Conditions PAS
1 2 3
Baseline 53 3 0
Non-consc. 194 26 2
Conscious 3 2 112
Average trial frequency of each presentation condition distributed on reported perceptual
awareness scale (PAS) responses per participant.
trials within each of the categories full match, object match,
spatial match, and non-match, where participants responded
“match.” In short, we compared hit rate (full match) and the
false alarm rates when only object identity matched (object FA),
only spatial position matched (spatial FA), and when neither
matched (baseline FA; Figure 5). A repeated-measures ANOVA
showed that there was a difference [F(3, 15) = 3.57, p = 0.02]
among hits/FAs. The planned paired t-tests (corrected for three
comparisons with the Holm-Bonferroni procedure) revealed that
the hit rate for non-conscious trials were greater than baseline
FA [t(15) = 2.29, p = 0.018, one-tailed], object FA [t(15) =
2.67, p = 0.009, one-tailed], and spatial FA [t(15) = 3.12,
p = 0.004, one-tailed]. There was no difference among FA rates
[repeated-measures ANOVA, F(2, 15) = 0.19, p = 0.83]. These
results confirm that the conjunction of spatial position and object
identity was retained throughout the delay.
Paired t-test comparisons of conscious DMS reaction time
(RT; ms; Figure 4B) demonstrated that hits [t(15) = 4.22, p =
0.001, M = 1194, SE = 87] and CRs [t(15) = 2.79, p = 0.014,
M = 1448, SE= 110] were faster than baseline (M = 1809, SE=
180). However, the paired t-test comparisons on non-conscious
DMS RT for hits [t(15) = −1.09, p = 0.29,M = 1721, SE = 145]
FIGURE 5 | The average proportion of hits, object-FA, spatial-FA, and
baseline-FA with standard error for non-conscious trials. *p < 0.05,
one-tailed.
FIGURE 4 | Task performance. (A) Mean d′ performance for non-conscious and conscious delayed match-to-sample (DMS; discrimination) tasks. (B) Mean DMS
response time (RT) for hits and correct rejections with standard error, and dotted lines that represents baseline RT.
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and CRs [t(15) = 1.83, p = 0.09, M = 1942, SE = 213] were not
faster than baseline. Indeed, the CRs RT was at trend with regard
to being slower than baseline RT.
Paired t-tests of RTs (aggregating hits, misses, FAs, and CRs)
showed that RTs of conscious trials (M = 1342, SE = 99) were
faster than RTs of non-conscious [t(15) = −3.33, p = 0.005,
M = 1841, SE = 187] and baseline [t(15) = −3.44, p = 0.004]
trials, while there was no difference between non-conscious and
baseline trials [t(15) = 0.70, p = 0.50]. These results are
consistent with Experiment I in showing that participants had not
already decided what to guess before the probe appeared.
Discussion
In Experiment I, we found that non-consciously perceived
visuospatial information can be maintained and influence
behavior 5–15 s after stimulus offset, thereby replicating
recent findings (Bergström and Eriksson, 2014). Although
the participants were instructed to only remember the spatial
position, it is possible that face identity and/or emotion
information also contributed to performance. For CFS, some
have found more reliable processing in the dorsal visual pathway
compared to the ventral pathway (Fang and He, 2005; Almeida
et al., 2008), but emotional faces (Tsuchiya et al., 2009; Faivre
et al., 2012) have also shown to be processed to some extent (see
Yang et al., 2014, for a review of CFS research).
In Experiment II, we specifically investigated the content of
the non-conscious VSTM representations. We found that spatial
position and object identity could be arbitrarily bound on a
trial-by-trial basis, and retained for prospective use after 5 s.
The specificity of the retained information (i.e., the conjunction
of spatial position and object identity rather than one of the
components) was further substantiated by the fact that the
average proportion of hits was significantly greater than baseline
FA, whereas spatial FA and object FA were not. However, in
ongoing experiments in our lab we have noted that spatial
information may be driving behavioral performance in similar
tasks, and we therefore do not exclude the possibility that specific
information components may dominate regulation of behavior
in different experiments. For example, it is possible that the
conscious task set of the participants can bias the non-conscious
short-term retention toward a specific content.
Although our current finding that the conjunction of spatial
position and object identity can be retained is consistent with
previous research on working memory (Jiang et al., 2000;
Olson, 2005; Wood, 2011), it does not rule out the influence
of other memory mechanisms. However, the use of only six
tools and four spatial positions that were reused over the
course of the experiment provided proactive interference from
previous trials, which makes short-lived unconsolidated long-
term memory mechanisms an unlikely explanation for the non-
conscious DMS d′ performance (Endress and Potter, 2014). For
the same reason, non-consciously encoded hippocampus-based
long-termmemory (Degonda et al., 2005; Reber et al., 2012; Duss
et al., 2014), where each trial is encoded as a specific episodic
representation (i.e., a specific temporal context paired with a
specific stimulus content), also seems unlikely. Furthermore, the
non-conscious retention of information cannot be explained by
residual activity in rod and cone receptors (i.e., iconic memory)
since such activity tend to subside within 1 s of stimulus offset
(Coltheart, 1980; Sligte et al., 2008).
It has recently been suggested that, contrary to common
belief, visual object recognition may be position dependent
(Kravitz et al., 2008). Kravitz et al. (2010) found decreased object
priming performance with changes in spatial position, and a
weaker ability to differentiate between object identity (based on
BOLD signal change in high-level object-selective cortex) across
positions compared to within positions. They therefore argued
that high-level object representations are position dependent. If
object representations indeed are position dependent and thereby
automatically processed together during visual object recogniton,
then it is reasonable to assume that this also is the case in lower-
level visual memories (e.g., repetition priming), and not unique
to higher-level visual memories (e.g., working memory). If true,
the arbitrary, trial-specificmatching of spatial position and object
identity does not by itself exclude an influence of repetition
priming.
The DMS task together with the arbitrary binding of spatial
position and a limited set of objects would effectively minimize
any automatic stimuli-response mapping, and thereby minimize
potential priming effects. However, masked priming effects can
remain without stimulus-response mapping (Van den Bussche
et al., 2009). Although non-consciously encoded priming has
been assumed to be short-lived (<500ms; Greenwald et al., 1996;
Mattler, 2005; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011), there are cases
of long-lasting effects (Bar and Biederman, 1998, 1999). The
discrepancy between short- and long-lasting non-consciously
encoded priming effects might partly be explained by a focus
on semantic rather than repetition priming when drawing
conclusions about non-conscious priming overall. For example,
it could be that non-consciously encoded semantic priming
(≤100ms; Greenwald et al., 1996; Draine and Greenwald, 1998)
is less durable than non-consciously encoded repetition priming
(15 and 20min; Bar and Biederman, 1998, 1999). Indeed, there
is a similar difference in longevity between consciously encoded
semantic and repetition priming (Henson, 2003). It would
therefore be prudent to assume, a priori, that non-consciously
encoded visual repetition priming effects might last for a few
seconds and possibly affect performance in a DMS task.
We hypothesized that RTs would be faster than baseline for
hits and CRs if the information was held in working memory,
but only for hits if the facilitation was caused by repetition
priming, since there were no stimuli repetitions to be facilitated
during CRs. The RTs for conscious trials in both experiments
confirmed our hypothesis regarding working memory, but the
RTs for non-conscious trials were variable. Consistent with
working memory, the first experiment showed faster RTs for
CRs compared to baseline, but this was not true for the
second experiment that instead showed a trend to the opposite.
Furthermore, non-conscious hits were not faster than baseline
in any of the experiments, which is inconsistent with repetition
priming effects. The absence of repetition priming effects despite
significant discrimination performance on the DMS task is in
line with our previous findings (Bergström and Eriksson, 2014),
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the assumption that repetition priming is less sensitive than
recognition memory (Berry et al., 2006), and studies showing
that priming has a negligible effect on recognition tasks (Poldrack
and Logan, 1997; Conroy et al., 2005). Taken together, the non-
conscious RTs did not show convincing support for working
memory per se, but did not support repetition priming as a likely
explanation either.
A likely strategy during trials with a consciously seen target is
to verbalize the information, which is consistent with debriefing
statements from the participants. Relatedly, a possible objection
to the interpretation that DMS performance on trials with non-
conscious targets reflects non-conscious working memory is that
participants might have verbalized a conscious representation
(e.g., “hammer in upper right quadrant”) by guesswork based
on non-conscious perception of the target, and then consciously
maintained the guess until probed. Such verbalization should
generate similar RTs for conscious and non-conscious trials.
However, control analyses showed that the RT for non-conscious
trials were slower than for conscious trials, suggesting that
participants did not use verbalization during non-conscious
trials. This is also what the participants reported during post-
experiment debriefing. Nevertheless, in principle, such response-
time differences could be caused by increased uncertainty rather
than strategy differences. Future research may clarify this issue.
There are several accepted approaches for defining the
presence/absence of conscious experience. We have here used
a subjective measure (the PAS). Subjective measures risk not
being completely exhaustive (Reingold and Merikle, 1988) of
conscious experiences, and might therefore overestimate non-
conscious effects. On the other hand, objective thresholds have
been criticized for not exclusively (Reingold and Merikle, 1988)
measuring conscious experience, and thereby underestimating
non-conscious effects. Indeed, it has been argued that task
performance can be an unreliable measure of conscious
experience (Lau, 2008). There is currently no consensus
on how to most exhaustively and exclusively measure the
absence/presence of conscious experience during perception
(Boly et al., 2013). However, Sandberg and colleagues (Sandberg
et al., 2010, 2014) have shown the PAS to be more exhaustive
(and thus more conservative) than other subjective measures
such as confidence ratings (Cheesman and Merikle, 1986),
as well as objective measures like post-decision wagering
(Persaud et al., 2007) and exclusion tasks (Debner and
Jacoby, 1994). Nevertheless, caveats regarding subjective
measures should be considered in relation to the current
results.
In conclusion, we found that non-consciously perceived
visuospatial information could be retained for prospective use
at least 15 s after stimuli offset, and that object identity and
spatial position could be arbitrarily bound and retained for
prospective use with a fidelity high enough to enable within-
category discrimination after 5 s. Our findings are consistent
with the notion of non-conscious working memory, although we
cannot, based on the current experiments, completely rule out
other memory mechanisms.
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